Chapter III - Last Chapter: Air Dominance as the Long-Term Edge

Chapter III: Air Dominance as the Long-Term Edge

Turkey has exposed flanks and borders, and this shapes where it is forced to commit its land forces. It is necessary for Turkey to spend and focus on a large infantry and armoured land army, especially along its Eastern and South Eastern borders, where dangerous militia and terrorist threats persist. In the Aegean, by contrast, control of the sea is the priority, and this is not a task suited to infantry. Spreading infantry across countless small islands is not a viable approach, since the enemy can choose the target, achieve surprise, concentrate his forces, and dominate the engagement. This resembles a blitzkrieg dynamic, but is in fact worse for the defender, since the islands cannot be reinforced or evacuated in time.

A simple answer to this problem would be to focus investment on the navy. However, given today's technology, the ideal and most durable long-term edge for Greece would instead come from air dominance. Through air dominance, the enemy's navy becomes practically unable to protect itself, and an air force is also capable of operating effectively over Thrace. Investing primarily in the navy would force Greece to rely on it exclusively and would leave the land army without adequate air cover. A modern air force, by contrast, both denies the enemy access to the Aegean and is able to support the land army at the same time. In addition, an air force is capable of threatening the enemy's harbours, industries, and key logistics deep within its own territory.

Ships are increasingly vulnerable to both air and sea drones, which makes it a dangerous strategy to commit an entire long-term posture to a small number of extremely costly vessels. Examining the geography, we see that Turkey is forced to spread its investments across all three main forces — land, sea, and air — simultaneously. Greece, by focusing on air power, gains not only control over the Aegean, with the ability to destroy the enemy's navy at will, but also the capacity to threaten targets deep inside Anatolia. There is also a psychological dimension to this: air dominance reassures friendly forces that they operate under cover, while placing the enemy under constant harassment and uncertainty. Focusing on air power, an area that provides immense leverage, gives Greece the ability to build a genuine long-term edge.

This alone, however, is not enough. It would be suicidal for Greece to continue having little to no armed drones while relying only on observation drones. Turkey has held close to a decade's lead in large and medium-sized armed drones, used primarily against high-value targets such as tanks, artillery, and air defence systems. The field that remains open is that of small drones aimed at low-cost targets and individuals — this is precisely the area where some degree of parity is still achievable. Unless immediate action is taken, however, Turkey will gain dominance in this field as well.

Overall, a strategy combining traditional air supremacy with anti-ship missiles and low-cost, hit-and-run missile-armed vessels can create a genuine long-term edge for Greece, provided the appropriate decisions are taken in time. The single most important threat to this strategy is Turkey's ballistic missile arsenal and its drone capability. The most basic solution is to keep air bases as far from the battlefield as possible, mainly as a defence against small-range drones — but this only works if Greece has established air dominance; otherwise, it risks losing response speed and aircraft availability when they are needed most. This approach would partially solve the danger posed by drones, though not entirely, and the ballistic missile threat remains real even for Greece's current aviation posture, which could still see its airports struck by Turkish ballistic missiles.

It should also be noted that today Greece's air-to-land and air-to-navy long-range arsenal is relatively small, an issue that is not unique to Greece but affects many NATO countries.

This connects back to the coordination strategy outlined in Chapter I. Pressure on Turkey from the Kurdish question and from the other actors surrounding it does not only create a general balance in the Aegean — it buys Greece time and commits additional Turkish forces away from the Aegean theatre, time and diversion of forces that Greece can use to build the air-dominance edge described in this chapter.

All Three Chapters on Aegean Policy

Aegean Policy — Chapter I: The Current Balance

Turkish diplomacy operates with flexibility, adapting quickly to shifting circumstances, while Greek diplomacy remains anchored to Western standards and to a close relationship with Israel — to the point that Greece stands as the most pro-Israeli state in EU diplomatic terms. Turkey, for its part, has made important advancements both in technology and in diplomacy, strengthening its hand on multiple fronts.

At present, Greek policy leans heavily on the expectation that its allies will withhold weapons from Turkey. This is not a sound basis for long-term strategy. A policy built on the hope that others will restrain Turkey on Greece's behalf cannot be sustained indefinitely, and Greece cannot afford to treat it as a substitute for its own strategic planning. Instead, Greece must strategically exploit the Aegean and Middle Eastern geography and geopolitics to its advantage.

Greece's northern flank is, in relative terms, secured. Albania and the "Skopje Republic" maintain a degree of hostility, but neither currently possesses a military force of real significance. Bulgaria remains neutral. This regional configuration allows Greece to concentrate its strategic attention and forces on Turkey, rather than dividing them across multiple fronts.

Turkey, by contrast, finds itself under pressure from nearly every direction. In the Caucasus, it faces Armenia; to the east, Iran; in Iraq, hostile militias remain active. To the south, Kurdish militias — though weakened — still represent a factor Turkey must account for. Now a new and significant threat has emerged in Israel. The only front that remains relatively secure for Turkey is Syria, which functions as something close to a semi-puppet state in its regional calculations. The cumulative effect is that Turkey is compelled to spread its considerable reserves across many fronts simultaneously, which in turn creates space for Greece to maintain a genuine balance of power in the Aegean.

This external pressure is compounded by an internal one. Turkey is home to a massive Kurdish minority, concentrated in South Eastern Anatolia, and some elements within it aspire to an independent Kurdish state. This internal dimension adds another layer to the pressure Turkey must manage, alongside the external fronts already described.

Given this, it is urgent for Greece to build serious relations and coordination with all of these regional actors that place pressure on Turkey. Most importantly, Greece should use lobbying in Washington to support the Kurds, who are currently losing ground in the regional balance. As for Israel, cooperation is clearly beneficial and should continue, but Greece should be cautious about deepening commitments, given the geopolitical and moral hazards such commitments could carry.

Chapter III will move beyond this analysis of how to preserve the current balance of power in the Aegean, and turn instead to how Greece can achieve a long-term, sustainable strategic edge.

Chapter II: Cyprus and the Question of Distance

Instead of moving directly to the long-term sustainable edge, I chose to place that discussion in Chapter III, and to first dedicate this chapter to Cyprus. It is unacceptable to construct an Aegean policy without first addressing the pressure Turkey can bring to bear on Cyprus, since that pressure alone has the capacity to make the entire Aegean policy collapse. Cyprus must therefore be examined on its own terms before any discussion of a sustainable long-term edge can be meaningful.

Cyprus is, historically, among the weakest points of Greek defensive strategy. This weakness stems from distance and logistics, a factor that works in the opposite direction for Turkey, which sits far closer to the island. In the early hours of any conflict, Greek Cypriots hold a numerical advantage over Turkish Cypriots, but this advantage is not durable: Turkish reinforcements can arrive quickly and change the tide of the situation.

Given Cyprus's small population and limited land, modern equipment can have a disproportionately large effect on a per capita basis, particularly anti-tank missiles. Drones, too, can act as a burden against any large-scale Turkish advance, inflicting damage and forcing Turkey to tie down additional reserves and equipment in the area rather than deploying them elsewhere.

Even so, distance from mainland Greece remains the central problem. Modern aircraft such as the Rafale, with their large operational range, offer a basic sense of security by helping to bridge that gap. Beyond this, it is important for Cypriot forces to harass Turkish logistics — particularly efforts to bring in additional troops — mainly through unorthodox tactics. These unorthodox tactics are mainly drones, which can effectively cut off Cyprus and harass Turkish transport vessels attempting to bring in reinforcements. While Turkey itself possesses capable drones, in the Cyprus context drones are more effective specifically at cutting logistics, which actually suits Cypriot defence.

Chapter III: Air Dominance as the Long-Term Edge

Turkey has exposed flanks and borders, and this shapes where it is forced to commit its land forces. It is necessary for Turkey to spend and focus on a large infantry and armoured land army, especially along its Eastern and South Eastern borders, where dangerous militia and terrorist threats persist. In the Aegean, by contrast, control of the sea is the priority, and this is not a task suited to infantry. Spreading infantry across countless small islands is not a viable approach, since the enemy can choose the target, achieve surprise, concentrate his forces, and dominate the engagement. This resembles a blitzkrieg dynamic, but is in fact worse for the defender, since the islands cannot be reinforced or evacuated in time.

A simple answer to this problem would be to focus investment on the navy. However, given today's technology, the ideal and most durable long-term edge for Greece would instead come from air dominance. Through air dominance, the enemy's navy becomes practically unable to protect itself, and an air force is also capable of operating effectively over Thrace. Investing primarily in the navy would force Greece to rely on it exclusively and would leave the land army without adequate air cover. A modern air force, by contrast, both denies the enemy access to the Aegean and is able to support the land army at the same time. In addition, an air force is capable of threatening the enemy's harbours, industries, and key logistics deep within its own territory.

Ships are increasingly vulnerable to both air and sea drones, which makes it a dangerous strategy to commit an entire long-term posture to a small number of extremely costly vessels. Examining the geography, we see that Turkey is forced to spread its investments across all three main forces — land, sea, and air — simultaneously. Greece, by focusing on air power, gains not only control over the Aegean, with the ability to destroy the enemy's navy at will, but also the capacity to threaten targets deep inside Anatolia. There is also a psychological dimension to this: air dominance reassures friendly forces that they operate under cover, while placing the enemy under constant harassment and uncertainty. Focusing on air power, an area that provides immense leverage, gives Greece the ability to build a genuine long-term edge.

This alone, however, is not enough. It would be suicidal for Greece to continue having little to no armed drones while relying only on observation drones. Turkey has held close to a decade's lead in large and medium-sized armed drones, used primarily against high-value targets such as tanks, artillery, and air defence systems. The field that remains open is that of small drones aimed at low-cost targets and individuals — this is precisely the area where some degree of parity is still achievable. Unless immediate action is taken, however, Turkey will gain dominance in this field as well.

Overall, a strategy combining traditional air supremacy with anti-ship missiles and low-cost, hit-and-run missile-armed vessels can create a genuine long-term edge for Greece, provided the appropriate decisions are taken in time. The single most important threat to this strategy is Turkey's ballistic missile arsenal and its drone capability. The most basic solution is to keep air bases as far from the battlefield as possible, mainly as a defence against small-range drones — but this only works if Greece has established air dominance; otherwise, it risks losing response speed and aircraft availability when they are needed most. This approach would partially solve the danger posed by drones, though not entirely, and the ballistic missile threat remains real even for Greece's current aviation posture, which could still see its airports struck by Turkish ballistic missiles.

It should also be noted that today Greece's air-to-land and air-to-navy long-range arsenal is relatively small, an issue that is not unique to Greece but affects many NATO countries.

This connects back to the coordination strategy outlined in Chapter I. Pressure on Turkey from the Kurdish question and from the other actors surrounding it does not only create a general balance in the Aegean — it buys Greece time and commits additional Turkish forces away from the Aegean theatre, time and diversion of forces that Greece can use to build the air-dominance edge described in this chapter.

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