Aegean Policy - Chapter II: Cyprus

Aegean Policy - Chapter II: Cyprus and the Question of Distance

Instead of moving directly to the long-term sustainable edge, I chose to place that discussion in Chapter III, and to first dedicate this chapter to Cyprus. It is unacceptable to construct an Aegean policy without first addressing the pressure Turkey can bring to bear on Cyprus, since that pressure alone has the capacity to make the entire Aegean policy collapse. Cyprus must therefore be examined on its own terms before any discussion of a sustainable long-term edge can be meaningful.

Cyprus is, historically, among the weakest points of Greek defensive strategy. This weakness stems from distance and logistics, a factor that works in the opposite direction for Turkey, which sits far closer to the island. In the early hours of any conflict, Greek Cypriots hold a numerical advantage over Turkish Cypriots, but this advantage is not durable: Turkish reinforcements can arrive quickly and change the tide of the situation.

Given Cyprus's small population and limited land, modern equipment can have a disproportionately large effect on a per capita basis, particularly anti-tank missiles. Drones, too, can act as a burden against any large-scale Turkish advance, inflicting damage and forcing Turkey to tie down additional reserves and equipment in the area rather than deploying them elsewhere.

Even so, distance from mainland Greece remains the central problem. Modern aircraft such as the Rafale, with their large operational range, offer a basic sense of security by helping to bridge that gap. Beyond this, it is important for Cypriot forces to harass Turkish logistics — particularly efforts to bring in additional troops — mainly through unorthodox tactics. These unorthodox tactics are mainly drones, which can effectively cut off Cyprus and harass Turkish transport vessels attempting to bring in reinforcements. While Turkey itself possesses capable drones, in the Cyprus context drones are more effective specifically at cutting logistics, which actually suits Cypriot defence.

After this much needed note on Cyprus, we will able to concentrate on building a long term edge (Chapter III)

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