Aegean Policy: Chapter I
Petros Laios
8/15/20262 min read
Aegean Policy — Chapter I: The Current Balance
Turkish diplomacy operates with flexibility, adapting quickly to shifting circumstances, while Greek diplomacy remains anchored to Western standards and to a close relationship with Israel — to the point that Greece stands as the most pro-Israeli state in EU diplomatic terms. Turkey, for its part, has made important advancements both in technology and in diplomacy, strengthening its hand on multiple fronts.
At present, Greek policy leans heavily on the expectation that its allies will withhold weapons from Turkey. This is not a sound basis for long-term strategy. A policy built on the hope that others will restrain Turkey on Greece's behalf cannot be sustained indefinitely, and Greece cannot afford to treat it as a substitute for its own strategic planning. Instead, Greece must strategically exploit the Aegean and Middle Eastern geography and geopolitics to its advantage.
Greece's northern flank is, in relative terms, secured. Albania and the "Skopje Republic" maintain a degree of hostility, but neither currently possesses a military force of real significance. Bulgaria remains neutral. This regional configuration allows Greece to concentrate its strategic attention and forces on Turkey, rather than dividing them across multiple fronts.
Turkey, by contrast, finds itself under pressure from nearly every direction. In the Caucasus, it faces Armenia; to the east, Iran; in Iraq, hostile militias remain active. To the south, Kurdish militias — though weakened — still represent a factor Turkey must account for. Now a new and significant threat has emerged in Israel. The only front that remains relatively secure for Turkey is Syria, which functions as something close to a semi-puppet state in its regional calculations. The cumulative effect is that Turkey is compelled to spread its considerable reserves across many fronts simultaneously, which in turn creates space for Greece to maintain a genuine balance of power in the Aegean.
This external pressure is compounded by an internal one. Turkey is home to a massive Kurdish minority, concentrated in South Eastern Anatolia, and some elements within it aspire to an independent Kurdish state. This internal dimension adds another layer to the pressure Turkey must manage, alongside the external fronts already described.
Given this, it is urgent for Greece to build serious relations and coordination with all of these regional actors that place pressure on Turkey. Most importantly, Greece should use lobbying in Washington to support the Kurds, who are currently losing ground in the regional balance. As for Israel, cooperation is clearly beneficial and should continue, but Greece should be cautious about deepening commitments, given the geopolitical and moral hazards such commitments could carry.
Chapter II will move beyond this analysis of how to preserve the current balance of power in the Aegean, and turn instead to how Greece can achieve a long-term, sustainable strategic edge.
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